Access to Higher Education : What counts as fairness in both an individual and systemic perspective? by Duru-Bellat, Marie & Gajdos, Thibault
Access to Higher Education : What counts as fairness in
both an individual and systemic perspective?
Marie Duru-Bellat, Thibault Gajdos
To cite this version:
Marie Duru-Bellat, Thibault Gajdos. Access to Higher Education : What counts as fairness in
both an individual and systemic perspective?. 2012. <hal-01069535>
HAL Id: hal-01069535
https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01069535
Submitted on 29 Sep 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
    
 
Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques publiques 
 
 
Access to Higher Education:  
What counts as fairness in both an 
individual and systemic perspective? 
Methodological Discussion Paper 
October 2012, nº1 
 
 
Marie Duru-Bellat 
Sciences Po, Observatoire sociologique du 
changement (OSC), CNRS  
 
Discussion by Thibault Gajdos 
CNRS, Groupement de recherche en économie 
quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM) 
 
 
Sciences Po | LIEPP 
27 rue Saint-Guillaume 
75337 Paris Cedex 07 
Tel : 01 45 49 83 61 
www.sciencespo.fr/liepp 
 
 
© 2012 LIEPP. All rights reserved.
   P a g e | 1 
Access to Higher Education: What counts as fairness in 
both an individual and systemic perspective? 
Marie-Duru Bellat 
 
Fairness issues are quite widespread in 
educational research. However, despite the large 
number of empirical studies on this topic, few 
question the precise way in which equality is 
defined and assessed. That is especially true with 
regards to access to higher education. In most 
empirical studies, it seems straightforward to 
consider fair any situation in which the rates of 
access to both higher education in general as 
well as to the most desirable tracks are equal 
irrespective of students’ personal characteristics 
(gender, social background, etc.). Conversely, 
one considers unfair any differences for example 
in the access to tracks according to gender, class 
or ethnic origin; any difference between groups 
is read as revealing some inequality or 
discrimination. The purpose of this note is to 
discuss this common view, and more specifically 
the pitfalls that must be overcome when making 
a diagnosis of fairness at the level of higher 
education, since this is a preliminary step to 
implementing a fair process of selection or to 
designing compensatory devices. 
We will highlight that access to higher 
education is at the intersection of a previous 
educational career and the outset of an 
occupational career, as it is supposed to prepare 
the entry into the job market. We maintain that 
the fact that the transition from the secondary to 
the tertiary level of education lies at this specific 
position makes it necessary to discuss the issue 
of fairness in a specific manner. 
1. Distinguishing fair/unfair 
inequalities, taking into account 
previous schooling 
Nowhere do entire generations reach the 
degree or exam required to be eligible for higher 
education. This means that previous selections 
have already taken place, which obviously 
matters as far as fairness is concerned.  
A necessary time perspective 
A perspective focused on fairness at the 
individual level may fail to take into account the 
fact that any fairness consideration is nested in 
the overall operation of the educational system. 
That is especially important when comparing the 
fairness of educational systems at some precise 
level across countries: here, the share of the 
population that participates at different levels of 
the system does matter. It has been shown that 
social inequalities in overall educational 
attainment are inversely correlated with the 
diffusion of tertiary education (Hout, 2007). The 
“timing” of the selection should also be 
included in any cross-countries comparisons. 
For example, when comparing France and 
Germany (Duru-Bellat, Kieffer and Reimer, 
2008), one should consider that social selection 
that took place prior to the degree required to 
enter higher education is both less marked and 
occurs later in the former, with the consequence 
that there will be more inequality at the 
transition to higher education. 
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The distribution of educational 
resources across the different levels should also 
be taken into consideration. For example, for 
two countries mobilizing the same amount of 
educational resources and showing similar 
patterns in terms of the amount of resources 
spent per pupil, structural inequalities may differ 
strongly based on the share of the population 
participating (‘covered’) at each level of 
education.  
At the individual level, when considering 
access to higher education, if the amount of 
prior selection has been substantial, the student 
population eligible for higher education will be 
more homogeneous. In addition, if this selection 
was grounded on academic basis, it most likely 
homogenizes students’ chances of success in 
their tertiary studies. Moreover, research shows 
that schooling careers are currently marked by 
social inequalities, concerning both attainment 
and choices of tracks or subjects. Sociologists 
often conclude that students from 
disadvantaged families reaching the final stage of 
secondary education are generally “over-
selected” and/or channeled into less valued 
tracks, often less demanding academically 
speaking. Consequently, in some cases, students 
may have equal chances of success in higher 
education, which obscures the fact that the 
amounts of selection they have previously 
undergone may differ. The diagnosis of fairness 
is not straightforward here, since even if equal 
transition rates to higher education are observed 
across the groups under consideration, only part 
of the whole cohort – which varies in size across 
the social groups under study –  has “survived” 
through the previous streaming and related 
selection. 
In France for instance, about 40% of the 
less-qualified manual workers’ children (versus 
about 85% of the most privileged children) pass 
the baccalauréat, which is the key to transition 
into higher education. So even if, among these 
eligible students, access to the most prestigious 
tracks of higher education were as widespread as 
it is among more advantaged students (which is 
not actually the case), the situation, while 
appearing “fair” at that level, would be far from 
fair across the board. In other words, a specific 
transition may appear fair (showing no 
significant differences of access between the 
groups under study, beyond those related to 
their academic level), while the overall 
educational career would not be judged so, since 
it has generated, through biased processes of 
attainment and choices, a variety of sub-
populations of eligible students (generally 
strongly linked to the students’ social 
backgrounds). 
This results from the fact that social 
inequality of attainment occurs from the 
beginning of the schooling career and 
accumulates over time, due to the cumulative 
dimension of academic progress. Said 
cumulative dimension is reinforced by tracking 
and subject choices in most countries, so that, 
all in all, the social inequality of schooling 
careers results equally from inequality of 
attainment and from inequality specifically 
linked with tracking and students’ choices (see 
for example Erikson and Jonsson, 2000). This 
generates unequal streams, based on academic 
achievement (meritocratic at least at the precise 
time of the tracking process) while generally 
including social biases.  
It is crucial to note –as far as fairness is 
concerned- that, to an extent, some of the 
inequalities in transition or in success in higher 
education may be fair: they may result from the 
students’ cumulative academic value or judicious 
choices. Concretely, when focusing on the 
fairness of the transition from secondary to 
higher education, is it then unfair if students 
leaving the weakest tracks are excluded (e.g. 
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through a formal selection process) from the 
most demanding ones, or if they fail to succeed 
once they are in tracks open to any and all 
students (as it is the case in French universities)? 
The answer to this is “no” whenever the formal 
selection did not incorporate any specific biases 
(relying only on academic value, as a reliable 
criteria of later success), or when the student’s 
previous level of attainment, as it stands, is too 
weak to allow success. One could consider this a 
situation of fair inequalities. 
Some might argue that the precise role 
of schooling is to reveal and create “fair” 
inequalities between students. This point is 
certainly debatable when considering 
compulsory education. Although a common 
core curriculum should result in a homogeneous 
level of attainment, shared by the whole 
generation, the necessary differentiating role of 
schooling is more defendable at the higher 
education level; there, diversified forms of 
schooling take place, with the objective of 
preparing a young generation for employment. 
In any case, and even if the bulk research in 
sociology of education does show that some of 
those previous inequalities are far from fair 
(especially given that they incorporate some 
social bias, such as self-selection, beyond purely 
academic aspects), the whole process of school 
selection and student ranking cannot be 
completely delegitimized. Moreover, at that 
level, a tension may exist between efficiency and 
equity, since the most efficient way to regulate 
access to higher education would be to select 
those students having the best assets needed for 
success, even if, in the meantime, we know that 
some of these assets are not the result of fair 
competition.  
All in all, even if it is legitimate to focus 
on a specific point in students’ schooling career, 
one cannot discard a time perspective especially 
at such a “final” level of education. Prior 
schooling generates some inequalities of 
educational attainment that cannot be ruled out 
as illegitimate, and which may be taken into 
account due to a concern for effiency. The 
problem is that these inequalities in academic 
value “incorporate” social inequalities, which 
have been generated gradually over the previous 
schooling career. Thus, the analysis of the 
generation of the academic value itself is part of 
the story as far as justice judgment is concerned. 
From observing differences to assessing 
fairness…  
A third point which complicates any 
judgment of fairness concerns the interpretation 
of what appears as inequalities in the academic 
level of eligible students. The issue at stake is 
how these inequalities have been generated. 
Concretely, how should we interpret the 
concentration of blue collar workers’ children in 
the vocational tracks, which results in much 
weaker chances of access to and success in 
higher education? It is appealing to try to 
separate what would result 
i) from a lower level of prior academic 
attainment (in France, the weakest pupils 
are channeled into such tracks),  
ii) from a more frequent channeling into 
those tracks by the board in charge of 
the tracking process, beyond what 
should result based purely on academic 
achievement, and 
iii) from the “choices” made by students 
themselves.  
This is an important, complex and 
policy-relevant issue. The results of the 
institution’s method of operation must be 
disentangled from an individual’s own 
responsibility. 
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The simplest case is that where most of 
social biases are rooted in the decisions made by 
the school boards themselves (ii). In such a case, 
the pupil’s social or ethnic background may be 
taken into account (implicitly or not) in the 
tracking decisions, rather than simply the pupil’s 
academic value. This may be due to some social 
prejudices (resulting in  discrimination) or 
material constraints (places to be filled in some 
tracks). In such a case, the school is responsible, 
and should compensate for this injustice.  
The first explanation (prior inequalities 
in attainment) is more mixed as far as the 
respective weight of institutional versus 
individual responsibility. In some cases, the 
responsibility of the school as an institution is, 
again, clearly involved, for example when pupils 
belonging to a certain group were systematically 
attending less efficient schools (i.e schools in 
which pupils do progress less). Here again, 
school should compensate. However, personal 
student responsibility may also be involved – 
one cannot maintain that students have no 
responsibility at all in their educational success. 
Of course, they cannot be judged responsible 
for the early difficulties some of them 
encountered in the first years of schooling, 
notably those based on their family’s 
socioeconomic and cultural resources. In any 
case, it is impossible to compensate for all the 
negative conditions and events individuals have 
faced and endured since birth.  However, the 
later in the schooling career this observation is 
made, the more difficult it becomes to discard 
any personal responsibility in one’s academic 
level of achievement.  
Assessing the part played by inequalities 
of “choices” raises similar questions. To some 
extent, students are not responsible for the 
preferences they inherit from their family. 
However, they do also develop their own 
preferences, and some choices which may, at 
first glance, appear to be inequalities may in fact 
result from these preferences. This is especially 
true at the “final” school level, when students 
are making life and career plans. Not all 
differences can be considered inequalities, since 
every person grows up within a group, with 
social and personal models and influences, 
leading to social preferences.  
It is of course difficult, or perhaps even 
impossible, to separate socially conditioned and 
authentic preferences. Beyond that debate, one 
may admit that the only thing policy-makers 
should examine is whether or not individuals 
with both the capacity and the will to pursue 
certain courses of study have been prevented 
from doing so. Unfortunately, this is not easy to 
assess. Implicitly, compensatory program 
promoters tend to consider all differences 
between groups as inequalities, which amounts 
to postulating that every pupil is both able and 
willing to choose what is considered to be the 
most desirable tracks. However, preferences 
cannot be considered universal, and students 
may choose not to seize the chances that are 
actually offered to them. Thus it is impossible to 
draw conclusion regarding equality of 
opportunities solely on the basis of inequality of 
choices. Chances that exist at the start are never 
visible, only those that have been grasped are...  
For example, to what extent should we 
consider as inequalities the different choices 
made by boys and girls? Certainly, they result 
from social influences – family gender roles, 
gender segregation on the job market, the social 
definition of masculinity and femininity – none 
of which are “chosen” by individuals… 
However, students may have “chosen” to adapt 
to those constraints and it would certainly be 
more relevant and efficient to change these 
social parameters if they are judged unfair, than 
to strive to have boys and girls make exactly the 
same choices when entering higher education, 
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which may appear to prevent freedom of choice. 
One may note at that point that the rationale of 
freedom and choice is currently considered 
legitimate at the individual level (it would lead to 
random variance); it is only when systematic 
differences between groups are observed that 
this question arises. 
Lastly, in some cases, students entering 
higher education may choose to cultivate true 
interests, whatever the opportunities that these 
studies may or may not offer later on in the job 
market, so that the studies they choose, at that 
stage, look more like consumption than a 
rational investment. This may occur more 
frequently when entry is open and attendance 
free, which is the case in France for example. In 
this case, is that fair that public funding is being 
allocated to financing private choices, while less 
funding is available at previous educational 
levels (due to the scarcity of financial resources), 
the level where some pupils are definitively 
excluded from further studies? This perspective 
is all the more relevant as higher education 
remains a scarce public good, a problem 
especially acute in the poorest countries. It is 
also especially relevant in a second sense, 
because access to this publicly funded level of 
studies is supposed to bring some public 
benefits. The second part of this note is devoted 
to these issues. 
2. Downstream inequality: inequality 
of what?  
A well-established tenet of the sociology 
of education (and other areas) is that the scarcer 
a good – i.e. something that has a value and is 
sought – is, the larger the social inequalities in 
acquiring it are. When the availability of that 
good increases (through a reduction in price or 
institutional mechanism), the indicators used to 
measure inequality in the access to that good 
diminish while the characteristics of those who 
do not have access become all the more socially 
disadvantaged. 
Opening is not enough… 
In this context, since increasing equity is 
one aspect of public policy for higher education, 
it is tempting to extend coverage in access, with 
the hope that expansion benefits the least 
privileged students more. This policy has been, 
at least implicitly, followed by most countries. 
The expansion of coverage of secondary 
education did occur in all countries, albeit at 
different times. These evolutions have also been 
pushed by the idea that the production of more 
human capital, in particular at the higher level, is 
an efficient way to foster economic growth. 
Putting the focus on this “knowledge economy” 
is also supposed to reduce social inequalities and 
foster social cohesion. This specifically has been 
the European rationale for promoting higher 
and higher levels of education, although many 
sociologists have expressed some skepticism 
(Wolf, 2002, Brown, 2003). 
This trend has helped to open the doors 
of higher education to some students from 
disadvantaged groups in the population, even if 
the benefits on that count remained contingent 
on progress in equity at lower levels of 
schooling. For the students involved, staying in 
school longer and increasing their level of 
knowledge may certainly be considered progress. 
While this dimension of the benefits associated 
with longer schooling is not to be downplayed, 
this evolution may be judged differently with 
regard to the variety of the countries’ economic 
contexts. Anderson (1961) and Boudon (1973) 
previously mentioned the tendency of systems 
of education to move faster than economies and 
job availability. This could potentially lead to 
deterioration in the match between graduates 
and jobs. Since that first warning, the vast 
majority of studies have demonstrated the reality 
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of the devaluation of diplomas in many 
European countries (see for example, Hadjar 
and Becker, 2009; Büchel et al., 2003). 
Obviously, the educational system has no power 
over the effective market value of the degrees it 
distributes, which itself results from the 
structural distribution of jobs and the peculiar 
relationships that prevail between degrees and 
qualifications.  
However, individuals with a secondary 
education diploma are led to register for higher 
education in spite of their knowledge that the 
subsequent prospects are likely not as good that 
they would have wished – to not do so would be 
worse from their point of view, in particular if 
existing structures, rules and incentives are not 
appropriate.  
Fairness without efficiency makes no sense… 
To analyze fairness in the access to 
higher education, it is necessary to take into 
account the value of the good itself: there is no 
point in being equitable if what is offered is a 
good without value. We must start identifying 
the characteristics of the type of good the 
secondary school graduates are seeking to 
acquire. At this juncture, two related distinctions 
are worth considering: 
The first is to determine the nature of 
the studies under consideration. To what extent 
is it a public or a private good?  It is a private 
good whenever the individual who embarks on 
the course of study later on appropriates the 
benefits deriving from the knowledge and 
credentials related to the studies privately. It is a 
public good if the benefits associated with the 
studies under consideration are mostly public in 
nature. Within this formal categorization, higher 
education is of a mixed nature, public since it 
may benefit the society to have better educated 
citizens and enjoy a higher rate of growth of the 
economy, and private because graduates may 
enjoy a better life style and remuneration.  
In this context, it is clear that an 
oversupply of graduates resulting in 
unemployment and/or access to low qualified 
jobs would jeopardize the value of the “higher 
education” good. This is obvious if we focus on 
the public dimension, since in that case society 
cannot draw benefits from the skills produced. 
Concerning the private dimension, the case is a 
bit more complicated. Particularly when the 
private cost of studies is limited to the 
opportunity costs (when registration costs are 
almost free, as in most public higher education 
in France), the decision a secondary-school 
graduate makes to continue at the higher level is 
made by comparing the earnings he (she) 
foregoes now and those he (she) expects as an 
outcome of his (her) “investment” in higher 
education. If what is foregone has little value 
(given the conditions of the labor market for 
secondary school graduates), the private 
incentives to enroll in higher education are still 
strong since more education is the best thing an 
individual can do, thereby creating a disconnect 
between the public and the private perspective, 
and consequently an inflation in higher 
education credentials.      
The second concept worth considering 
is whether higher education is pursued as 
consumption or investment. Pursuing education 
with a consumption perspective implies that the 
benefits from registering in higher education are 
not expected to carry a professional or a 
monetary dimension. Rather, students register 
for such studies because it is considered 
interesting and enjoyable. By contrast, the 
investment perspective does not bank on the 
interest of the studies themselves but on the fact 
that they are expected to bring a good job and 
command high earnings. Here again, the reality 
is somewhere in between these two poles, since 
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there is probably always some amount of 
enjoyment in studying the subject one has 
chosen, as well as some marketable value in any 
domain of knowledge. However, the 
intersection is clearly not located at the same 
distance from the two focal perspectives for all 
types and fields of study. 
It is necessary to determine to what 
extent these two concepts and classification 
have a bearing upon the discussion about 
fairness in access to higher education. The aim 
(a policy-relevant one) is to achieve a mix of 
efficiency and equity. However, efficiency comes 
first, and the real issue is how to make equitable 
a process that needs be efficient. 
The classification of the goods acquired 
in higher education allows us to create the 
different combinations (which are like ideal-
types), which set the scene in which access to 
education and fairness issues have to be 
discussed.  
1. The good is a “pure” consumption 
2. The good is considered an investment. 
2.1. It has high public and high private 
returns 
2.2. Its private returns are its main 
characteristics 
2.3. It has high public value but relatively low 
private returns   
2.4. It has less (or less obvious) value, both in 
its private and public dimensions. 
A first question is whether access should be 
encouraged or regulated. The two main tools for 
that are the implementation of some academic 
selection (through a variety of devices), and 
registration fees.  
1. In the first case – a “pure” consumption good 
– a spontaneous vision would result in open 
access to this kind of studies (no selection, and 
free of charge, as are most humanities tracks in 
French universities). However, efficiency 
consideration for the public system suggests the 
implementation of some fees, because if there is 
no public benefit, there are some public costs, 
which carry an opportunity value. 
2.1 In this case, since a high private value exists, 
this kind of studies may be privately financed. 
However, this should not prevent students from 
registering nor should it exclude poor students. 
Moreover, access should be encouraged since it 
has a high public value. To regulate access to 
these types of tracks, academic selection to 
attract the best students should be implemented 
jointly with access to financing, e.g. with the 
State subsidizing loans especially for the poor 
students. 
2.2 When public returns are more moderate, in 
spite of high private returns, private financing is 
again fair. Academic selection is less central and 
can be, at least to some extent, geared by the 
students themselves. Some targeted loans should 
also be implemented for poor academically 
capable students. 
2.3 A more complex case occurs whenever both 
a high public value and only moderate private 
returns coexist. Here, what is at stake is to 
attract students with a good academic value, 
without any social bias. One way of doing this is 
to combine some academic selection and 
substantial subsidies to allow free studies. 
2.4 Whenever public and private returns are 
seen to be on the low side, a variety of strategies 
may be implemented with two political 
objectives: the private costs should be set so that 
they do not encourage students too much, on 
the one hand, and are politically acceptable, on 
the other.  
Academic selection plays a significant 
role, in cases 2.1 and 2.2 (as well as in case 2.3). 
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Discussions can be lively both about the specific 
features by which academic selection can be 
implemented and about the extent to which it is 
a fair mechanism.  
Moreover, especially for studies 
providing high private returns to students later 
on the labor market, one should consider private 
contributions. On the efficiency side, this is 
positive for two reasons: firstly, it creates 
positive incentives to the services providers to 
boost quality and relevance, while providing 
them with resources to do so, and secondly, it 
helps to expand the supply through private 
schools, which may be desirable. In France for 
example, the vast majority of engineering 
schools are both public and free, a context that 
does not help private schools to operate in that 
field, even though some suggest there is 
consistent under-supply of such engineering 
graduates on the labor market.  
The common wisdom, however, is that 
tapping a private contribution from students 
would prevent both good and poor students 
from enrolling and encourage them to select 
other types of studies. This is obviously to be 
expected if there is not an appropriate capital 
market for these students to finance their 
studies. Whenever some mechanism allows 
academically bright and socially disadvantaged 
students to easily borrow the money needed to 
finance their studies, the case is totally different. 
They invest in their own human capital and they 
will be able to pay the loan back when they hold 
a good job. Moreover, the equity consequences 
of private financing in these studies may also 
carry positive outcomes on equity from a wider 
perspective. The point is that the public 
resources that have been saved can potentially 
be used to provide better opportunities to 
underprivileged students either in higher or 
secondary education.  
Recall, at the outset of these 
developments, that here the private returns are 
considered as exogenous, resulting from present 
market forces, while public policies may also 
consider to change them. 
Conclusion 
In this note, we have maintained that the 
issue of fairness must be tackled in a specific 
manner due to higher education’s position as the 
final step within the schooling system: a time 
perspective must be implemented that includes 
the fact that students do not arrive at this 
educational stage on “equal” footing, as well as 
the fact that the studies themselves have an 
unequal value, dependent on the benefits that 
can be drawn from them on the job market. A 
concern for fairness should take into account 
these two slopes, upstream and downstream. 
To tackle this double-sided issue, so that 
fairness may be achieved, some specific 
regulations and provisions should be 
implemented. Policies are basically structured 
around three elements, namely public/private 
financing, the use of academic selection and 
specific compensatory devices. Those 
regulations and provisions should be tailored 
according to the nature of the “good” delivered 
by higher education: the fairness issue has a 
different meaning based on whether the studies 
are considered a private consumption or a 
public/private investment.  
Fairness may only exist and be pushed 
forward in a global system where efficiency 
considerations are taken into account, and 
regulations are implemented to achieve it. That 
is why it is legitimate to consider that efficiency 
comes first, even if it may appear at first glance 
more generous to focus only on fairness. It 
should also be stressed that the fairness issue 
should not be tackled solely via the use of anti-
discriminatory devices focused on individuals. 
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The systemic perspective should not be taken as incidental. 
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 Discussion by: Thibault Gajdos 
 
The design of education policies is one 
of the most challenging issues faced by 
governments. One reason is that, as Marie 
Duru-Bellat shows, one expects the educational 
system to be both fair and efficient. These two 
objectives are clearly distinct, and might be 
conflicting. Marie Duru-Bellat offers a 
clarification of these two objectives, a necessary 
prerequisite in the design and the evaluation of 
public policies. In this short comment, we will 
put our (economic) feet in her (sociological) 
steps, and try to figure out how the conceptual 
clarification that she provides can be translated 
into operational tools for evaluating educational 
policies.    
1. Fairness  
Marie Duru-Bellat starts by making two 
crucial observations. First, the distribution of 
individual transition rates at between two given 
stages of the educational system (e.g., between 
secondary school and university) cannot be 
taken as a good measure of inequalities. Indeed, 
in order to be eligible for the considered 
transition, students had to go through an 
education and selection process that may have 
generated unfair biases. Moreover, the benefits 
students would get from attending higher 
education should also be taken into account. 
Second, all inequalities are not unfair. In 
particular, individuals might, at least to some 
extent, be considered responsible for their 
academic success. Let us consider these two 
questions successively.  
 
 
1.1 Inequality of what? 
Certainly, studying may be, and often is, 
enjoyable per se. But public policies tend to focus 
more on the output than of the process of 
education. Still, there are many ways to measure 
this output. Thus, one has to take a clear stand 
on this point. Marie Duru-Bellat focuses on 
earning abilities. This is certainly reasonable, but 
one should stress that other choices are possible. 
It can be the cognitive and social abilities of the 
individuals. It can also be their earning 
capacities, their freedom to choose the way of 
life (including the kind of job) they desire, or 
even respect and recognition. The policy maker 
(and not the social scientist) has here to make a 
decision. Access to higher education might be a 
step in reaching one of these objectives, but can 
hardly be considered as the final goal of 
education.  
Being clear enough on this point 
dissolves one of the tensions between equity and 
efficiency identified by Marie Duru-Bellat. 
Indeed, the fact that equalizing access to higher 
education does not necessarily entail improving 
earning capacities (either because of mismatch 
between jobs and degrees, or because of a 
"devaluation" of diploma) should not be 
considered as a conflict between efficiency and 
equity, but between two distinct objectives 
(earning capacities and access to higher 
education per se). Thus, Marie Duru-Bellat's 
argument should be read as a convincing 
demonstration that access to higher education is 
not a pertinent objective, and cannot even be 
considered as a good proxy; not that there is a 
conflict between efficiency and equity. 
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In passing, Marie Duru-Bellat makes a 
very important point. All curricula cannot be 
considered as equivalent with regards to the 
earning capacities they confer. One should thus 
carefully distinguish among them when studying 
efficiency and equity of education. This is 
actually true for other dimensions than earning 
capacities as well. Thus, Marie-Duru Bellat’s 
arguments call for designing a fine-grained 
analysis, which contrasts with the usual practice 
in economics of education, which generally take 
a broad view and consider higher education 
globally. This would be particularly important in 
a very segregated system such as the French one.  
1.2 What Inequalities? 
The second point made by Marie Duru-
Bellat is that not all inequalities should be 
considered unfair. As she clearly states, "the 
results of the institution's method of operation 
must be disentangled from an individual's own 
responsibility". Marie Duru-Bellat points that 
one difficult problem is "to separate socially 
conditioned and authentic preferences".  This 
echoes a long-lasting debate in philosophy 
(Cohen, 1989; Arneson, 1989), and is precisely 
the aim of John Roemer's theory of Equality of 
Opportunity (Roemer, 1998).  
Roemer's idea is to distinguish between 
variables that are under the individual's control 
(for which they are thus responsible), and those 
that are beyond their control (i.e., 
circumstances). An equal-opportunity policy 
aims at "leveling the field", by ensuring that all 
individuals that make the same effort obtain the 
same result, regardless of the circumstances 
(e.g., family background) they face. This theory 
can be translated into operational tools, and has 
actually been used to evaluate the fairness of 
education (Betts and Roemer, 2006). The basic 
idea is the following. Assume that there are two 
types of individuals: those who come form 
wealthy families, and those who come from 
poor families. Assume for the sake of 
simplification that the educational performance 
of a student only depends on their effort and on 
their type. As noted by Marie Duru-Bella, a 
difficulty here is that students’ choice of effort 
level might depend on their types (e.g., because 
rich families value more education). Now, for 
each type, rank individuals by their effort levels. 
Equality of opportunity requires that two 
individuals with the same rank (regardless of 
their type) be offered the same outcome. Doing 
so, one neutralizes the effect of circumstances, 
including on the preferences of individuals. This 
is a very operational way to solve the problem 
raised by Marie Duru-Bellat. Of course, it 
requires the first question ("Equality of what?") 
to have been solved. But it also requires that one 
clearly distinguish between what the individual 
should be taken as responsible for, and what 
should be considered as "circumstances". This is 
an important and difficult question, that should 
also be answered by the social planner (and not 
the social scientist).  
2. Efficiency 
Exactly as one should answer the 
question: "equality of what?" when measuring 
the fairness of the educational system, one 
should be clear about the outputs expected from 
higher education. Again, Marie Duru-Bellat 
focuses on earning capacities. This is certainly 
legitimate. But education produces other 
outputs, both private and public (see Lochner 
(2011) for a review). In particular, there is 
consistent evidence that more education induces 
better health, greater life-expectancy, lower 
crime rates, and improves citizenship (vote 
registration and participation, support of 
democratic values, etc.). Taking these effects 
into account may completely change the picture.  
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This is certainly not an easy task, but 
recent studies show that it is not impossible. 
One approach consists in taking a global point 
of view. One tries to evaluate education through 
the amount people are ready to pay for an 
increase in education (whether they are directly 
concerned or not). This method is well known 
among economists under the name of 
"contingent-valuation", and has recently been 
used to evaluate higher education in Kentucky 
(Blomquist and coll., 2009). One drawback to 
this method is that it does not allow one to 
disentangle the value of the different outcomes 
of education (income, health, and social 
outcomes). More sophisticated econometric 
strategies are necessary for this, and have been 
proposed by Heckman and collaborators (2011). 
It is thus in principle possible to go beyond the 
analysis proposed by Marie Duru-Bellat, and to 
investigate the return of higher education across 
all it dimensions. This would be a necessary step 
to complement the picture we have of the 
efficiency of the educational system.  
But evaluating the output of the 
educational system is not yet measuring its 
efficiency. The same output could perhaps be 
obtained using less resources (which is the 
notion of efficiency used among economists). 
Or, similarly, might a better result be obtained 
using differently the same amount of resources? 
A first step towards an answer to this question 
can be made using Marie Duru-Bellat's 
observation, according to which what matters is 
not only the situation of students at a given 
time, but their complete life cycle of education. 
In particular, one may wonder if a better result 
would not be obtained by transferring resources 
from one stage (say, higher education) to 
another stage (say, primary school or even pre-
school). Such is precisely the point made by 
James Heckman and his colleagues (see 
Heckman (2006) for a review). They show that 
early investments in education have higher 
returns. Moreover, the return of educational 
investments in early childhood are considerably 
higher for disadvantaged children than for 
others. Investing in early education might thus 
be more efficient and reduce inequalities. This 
suggests, at least, that thinking about equity in 
access to higher education requires one to 
consider the educational system as a whole – 
with a particular attention to its early stages.
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